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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
S1~ATE OF UTAH 
DELTA H. LEWIS, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
C. A. SAVAGE, KENNETH C. SA V-
AGE, C. A. SAVAGE, doing business as 
SAVAGE COAL AND TIMBER COM-
PANY, and SAVAGE COAL AND 
TIMBER COMPANY, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Case No. 
8733 
The Statement of Facts contained in appellant's brief 
represents but a partial excerpt of the facts and is argu-
mentative in form. We feel it necessary to restate these 
facts for the benefit of the court. 
Plaintiff, Delta H. Lewis, and her husband, Dow T. 
Lewis, were residents of Montana. They left Whitehall on 
August 1, 1955, at about 11:00 o'clock in the evening, 
with their final destination being Salt Lake City. They 
stopped in Idaho Falls and then proceeded to Alameda, just 
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outside of Pocatello, where the accident occurred. They 
reached that point at approximately 4:45 A.M. on AP~ust 
2nd. 
The highway is two lanes from Chubbeck until it 
reaches Alameda, where it goes to a newly improved high-
way of four traveling lanes and an outer lane for part time 
parking. Where the two lanes go into the new highway 
there is an intersection with a stop light. Mr. Lewis was 
driving and had been traveling at about 50 miles per hour. 
The semaphore was green and when he passed the inter-
section and entered the new highway he turned from the 
left or center lane, across the next lane to the extreme 
righthand lane and struck the left rear end of defendants' 
truck which was stopped in the outside or righthand lane. 
Mr. Lewis did not see the defendants' truck until he was 
right on it. (T. 9-16) 
After the accident Mr. Lewis observed that the lights 
were on in the truck and there were red flags located on 
the back of the lumber. The truck was stopped under a 
street light some 250 to 300 feet from the intersection with 
the semaphore. The street was fully lighted and dawn had 
broken and it was light enough to distinguish objects on, 
ahead and to the side of the road. At the time of the acci-
dent there was a milk truck traveling north about a full 
block south of the point of impact. There was very little 
traffic on the road that morning. Mr. Lewis' lights were 
good and he passed no cars going his way when the accident 
occurred, nor were there any cars in front of him going 
his way. 
The course taken by Mr. Lewis' car from the intersec-
tion to the point of impact, together with the physical con-
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clition of the road, are represented on the exhibits intro-
du.cv::l in evidence. (T. 16-39) 
The speed limit where the accident occurred is 3 5 miles 
per hour. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
THE NEGLIGENCE OF PLAINTIFF'S HUSBAND 
WAS THE SOLE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE AC-
CIDENT. 
POINT II. 
PLAINTIFF WAS GUlL TY OF NEGLIGENCE. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE NEGLIGENCE OF PLAINTIFF'S HUSBAND 
WAS THE SOLE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE AC-
CIDENT. 
The record amply discloses that there can be no ques-
tion as to the negligence of plaintiff's husband. The law 
of Idaho is the same as the law of Utah, which requires 
that a person driving an automobile must proceed at such 
a rate of speed that he may ordinarily be able to stop and 
avoid striking an object ahead of him which a prudent 
driver would see. Maier v. Minidoka County Motor Com-
pany, 105 P. 2d 1076. In that case the court said: 
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((Generally it is evidence as a matter of law, 
or at least strong evidence of negligence, for a 
motorist to operate his automobile on a highway at 
such a speed that the automobile cannot be stopped 
within the distance within which objects can be 
seen ahead of the automobile." 
The court continued and also addressed itself to the ques-
tion of proximate cause, and its holding is even more 
conclusive in this case because plaintiffs urges violation of 
an ordinance as constituting negligence. The Idaho court 
said this: 
((Appellants urge in effect that traveling on 
the highway on a bicycle at night without a lighted 
headlamp as provided by statute constitutes negli-
gence and therefore contributory negligence as a 
matter of law was proven. In Tendoy v. West, 
supra (51 Idaho 679, 9 P. 2d 1027), this court 
stated: (In the absence of some probable causal con-
nection, bald negligence per se can raise no pre-
sumption of proximate cause: it may be wholly 
innocent. It is no more effective than any other 
kind of negligence. Where, on the question of 
proximate cause, men's minds may honestly differ, 
it should always be submitted to the jury. Kelly 
v. Troy Laundry Co., supra (46 Idaho 214, 267 P. 
222); Hooker v. Schuler, 45 Idaho 83, 260 P. 1027; 
Hall v. Hepp, 210 App. Div. 149, 205 N.Y.S. 474, 
holding that the violation of a traffic law must be 
established as the proximate cause of the injury, 
the question being one of fact, citing Clark v. 
Doolittle, 205 App. Div. 697, 199 N.Y.S. 814; 
Martin v. Oregon Stages, 129 Or. 435, 277 P. 291, 
294, asking the pertinent question, uwas the ab-
sence of a white light the approximate cause of the 
collision?" After declaring the plaintiff guilty of 
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negligence per se for driving after sundown with-
out a taillight, the court said in Gleason v. Lowe, 
232 Mich. 300, 205 N. W. 199, 200, ((It was a 
question of fact for the jury whether there was 
any causal connection between the statutory vio-
lation of plaintiff and the injury occasioned by de-
fendant"; Martin v. Carruthers, 69 Colo. 464, 195 
P. 105, 106, conceding plaintiff's negligence per se, 
but declaring, ((There is room for two opinions 
under the evidence as to whether that negligence 
was a cause contributing to the collision." To the 
same effect are Darby v. Jarrett, 26 Ohio App. 194, 
15 9 N. E. 8 58 ; Giorgetti v. Wollaston, 8 3 Cal. A pp. 
358, 257 P. 109. But it is unnecessary to multiply 
authority.' " 
Mr. Lewis drove into the rear of defendants' truck 
when he had two full lanes of unobstructed space to pass 
the truck; the truck was lighted with a taillight and two 
clearance lights in the rear with red flags on each corner 
of the lumber, and was under a street light where it was 
clearly visible. In fact, Mr. Lewis testified to the fact 
that the red flags were on the back of the truck and that 
the lights were on and he, in fact, had no difficulty seeing 
the milk truck coming about a block away and identified 
it as a truck. The only conclusion that can be reached 
from his own testimony is that he was either going too 
fast to turn and avoid the end of the truck, or he was 
negligently not paying attention to where he was driving. 
Plaintiff repeatedly refers to circumstances which the 
record does not support, namely, a time element of half 
an hour that Officer Wharton purportedly saw the truck 
stand before the disaster. A careful reading of the record 
would indicate that Officer Wharton saw the lumber truck 
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and then went about his errands; that the accident oc-
curred while he was so occupied and that he came upon the 
scene sometime after it had happened. He substantiated 
the testimony of the defendants that they had stopped 
only for the purpose of adjusting the load and were ready 
to start when the accident occurred. Officer Wharton 
also testified that the lane where the truck was parked was 
considered a parking lane by him, and that there were no 
signs to advise the defendants of anything to the contrary 
until another block farther south, and it could not be 
read from the truck stopped where it was. We submit 
that the negligence of Mr. Lewis is so glaring as to defy 
any other conclusion. 
It is obvious in this case that Mr. Lewis' negligence 
was the sole proximate cause of the accident, and Mrs. 
Lewis should not be allowed to recover. The defendants 
were doing what they had a right to do as they were 
stopped to check the load and to tighten the binders. There 
is no violation of an ordinance prohibiting parking. Sec-
tion 49-521 (d) of the Idaho Code defines upark" as fol-
lows: 
u (d) (Park'-When prohibited means the 
standing of a vehicle, whether occupied or not, 
otherwise than temporarily for the purpose of and 
while actually engaged in loading or unloading." 
The Idaho law has been construed and the Idaho Court 
has held that the statute forbidding parking at night on a 
highway was not violated when a truck stopped because of 
engine trouble. State v. Hintz, 102 P. 2d 639. In addi-
tion, the general rule of law throughout the United States 
seems to be that upark" means something more than mere 
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temporary or momentary stoppage on a road for a neces-
sary purpose. Such things as changing a tire or engine 
trouble, or loading or unloading, or adjusting a load, have 
been held not to be in violation of the statute or ordinance. 
See Motor Lines v. Gillette, 177 So. 881, 235 Ala. 157; 
Marinkovich v. Tierney, 17 P. 2d 93, 93 Mont. 72; State 
v. Carter, 172 S. E. 415,205 N.C. 761; Palmer v. Marceille, 
175 A. 31, 106 Vt. 500; Martin v. Oregon Stages, 277 P. 
291, 129 Ore. 435; Fontaine v. Charas, 181 A. 417, 87 
N.H. 424; Tibbetts v. Dunton, 174 A. 453, 133 Me. 128; 
Stallings v. Buchan Transport Co., 185 S. E. 643,210 N.C. 
201; Fleming v. Flick, 35 P. 2d 210, 140 Cal. App. 14; 
Hartwell v. Progressive Transp. Co., 270 N. W. 570, 198 
Minn. 488. The foregoing are but a few of many cases 
all holding the same. 
Although plaintiff alleged the violation of an ordi-
nance, and we submit no violation occurred in this case, 
the law is generally recognized that the question of proxi-
mate cause must be resolved. Even if the court should con-
sider that a possible violation of the ordinance occurred, 
such violation could not have been a proximate cause of 
this accident. No emergency occurred which would have 
prevented Mr. Lewis from both seeing and avoiding the 
truck, and the truck did not block the highway in any 
degree sufficient to have caused the accident. In fact, 
Officer Wharton testified that the right wheels of the 
truck were right up against the curb. Counsel has cited 
the case of Hillyard v. Utah By-Products Co., 263 P. 2d 
287. That case dealt with the question of proximate cause. 
The only possibility of the violation of an ordinance being 
a proximate cause of that accident was that the driver of 
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the vehicle was unable to pass the truck because of on-
coming traffic. No such circumstance exists in this case 
and the only thing that caused the accident was the fail-
ure of Mr. Lewis to keep his car under control sufficiently 
to drive down the highway in two free lanes of traffic, or 
more if he needed it, or to drive at a speed that was reason-
able and safe under the circumstances, or to see a well 
lighted truck under a street light at a time when it was 
light enough to have seen a truck apparently with or with-
out lights. 
In plaintiff's brief counsel urge that the sanctity ac-
cording to the verdict of the jury on conflict of the evi-
dence is not present here. Surely counsel cannot apply a 
different rule of law to the sanctity of the court sitting 
as a jury. The court below tried the case and decided the 
same upon the facts, the defendant having prevailed. This 
court must consider the evidence and every reasonable in-
ference in a light most favorable to the defendant. Jensen 
v. Mower, 294, P. 2d 683. 
POINT II. 
PLAINTIFF WAS GUlL TY OF NEGLIGENCE. 
Plaintiff has stressed the point that the laws of Idaho 
are presumed to be the same as the laws of Utah in the 
absence of proof to the contrary, and the courts will not 
take judicial notice of foreign law. Although no pretrial 
order was entered in this case, a pretrial was had and coun-
sel in open court discussed the laws of the State of Idaho 
governing this case and the doctrine of imputed negli-
gence. One of counsel stated to the court that he had not 
considered the law of Idaho and desired time within which 
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to study the matter. At this pretrial we urged the court 
to consider the dismissal of the case on the doctrine of im-
puted negligence and this particular issue of law was 
formed. It is our understanding that when issues of fact 
and questions of law have been formed at pretrial, under 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure no proof is required at 
the trial. The very purpose of the Rules is to avoid a 
multiplicity of proof. We submit it was fully understood 
by court and counsel that if the court determined that 
under the laws of Idaho the doctrine of imputed negli-
gence existed, and if the court found negligence on the 
part of Mr. Lewis, there could be no recovery by plaintiff. 
The laws of the state where the accident occurred 
control the rights and liabilities of the parties. In Blash-
field Cyclopedia of Automobile Law and Practice, Vol. 9, 
Sec. 579, pages 31, 36 and 37, the rule is given: 
((Where an accident occurs in one state, and 
the suit is brought in another, the question may 
arise as to whether the laws of the forum or the 
laws of the state where the accident occurred con-
trol. The rights and liabilities of parties in automo-
bile accidents, as a general rule, are determined by 
the laws of the state where the accident oc-
curred. ,. . ,. . * 
uThus, under the law of the state where the 
injury occurs, the action may survive against the 
estate of the tort-feasor, but the right of action 
may not survive under the law of the state where 
the suit is brought. In such case, the right of action 
depends upon the law of the state where the injury 
occurs, rather than of the jurisdiction where the 
suit is brought. * * * 
rr A rule of law of the place where the accident 
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occurs with reference to imputing the negligence 
of a motorist to a guest or other occupant riding 
in the automobile is deemed a rule of substantive 
law rather than merely a rule of evidence, and 
hence is controlling, though the lex fori be dif-
ferent." (Emphasis ours) 
The foregoing authority cites the case of W. W. Clyde 
& Co. v. Dyess, 126 F. 2d 719, (C.C.A. lOth, 1942). This 
case is most interesting because of the similarity of the 
accident, and the wife sued to recover for personal in-
juries, alleging she was a guest in herhusband's automobile. 
The accident happened in Utah and the court held that 
the law of Utah applied, rather than Texas where com-
munity property applied: 
((The right to recover damages for personal 
injuries is a property right in that state, and a 
chose in action for such injuries suffered by a mar-
ried woman belongs to the community estate. Ezell 
v. Dodson, 60 Tex. 331; Texas Central Ry. Co. v. 
Burnett, 61 Tex. 6 3 8 ; Northern Texas Traction 
Co. v. Hill, Tex. Civ. App., 297 S.W. 778; Bostick 
v. Texas & P. Ry. Co., Tex. Civ. App., 81 S.W. 
2d 216. And recovery cannot be had in that state 
for personal injuries sustained there by a married 
woman if the negligence of her husband was a con-
tributing cause, for the reason that such negligence 
on his part is imputed to her. Missouri Pac. Ry. 
Co. v. White, 80 Tex. 2025, 15 S.W. 808; Texas & 
Pac. Ry. Co. v. Rea, 27 Tex. Civ. App. 549, 65 
S. W. 1115 ; Northern Texas Traction Co. v. Hill, 
supra; Bostick v. Texas & P. Ry. Co., supra; Dallas 
Ry. & Terminal Co. v. High, 129 Tex. 219, 103 
s.w. 2d 735. 
((But with rare exceptions matters relating to 
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the right of action arising out of a tort which re-
sults in death, personal injury, or other wrong, are 
governed by the law of the place where the tort 
occurred. Northern Pacific Railroad Co. v. Bab-
cock, 154 U.S. 190, 14 S. Ct. 978, 38 L.Ed. 958; 
Slater v. Mexican National Railroad Co., 194, 
U.S. 120, 24 S. Ct. 581, 48 L. Ed. 900; American 
Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 29 
S. Ct. 511, 53 L.Ed. 826, 16 Ann. Cas. 1047; Cuba 
Railroad Co. v. Crosby, 222 U.S. 473, 32 S. Ct. 132, 
56 L.Ed. 274, 38 L.R.A., N.S., 40; Vancouver 
Steamship Co., Ltd., v. Rice, Administratrix, 288 
U.S. 445, 53 S. Ct. 420, 77 L.Ed. 885; Young v. 
Masci, 289 U.S. 253, 53 S. Ct. 599, 77 L.Ed. 1158, 
88 A.L.R. 170; Hunter v. Derby Foods, Inc., 2 Cir., 
110 F. 2d 970, 133 A.L.R. 255. And ordinarily 
where a tort is committed in one state and recovery 
of damages is sought in another, the substantive 
rights of the parties are governed by the law of the 
former while questions of remedy or procedure are 
referable to the law of the latter. O'Neal v. Caf-
farello, 303 Ill. App. 574, 25 N.E. 2d 534; Meyer 
v. Weimaster, 278 Mich. 370, 270 N.W. 715; 
Laughlin v. Michigan Motor Freight Lines, 276 
Mich. 545, 268 N.W. 887; Sutton v. Bland, 166 
Va. 132, 184 S.E. 231; Wood v. Shrewsbury, 117 
W. Va. 569, 186 S.E. 294; Farfour v. Fahad, 214 
N.C. 281, 199 S.E. 521. 
ttThis accident occurred in Utah and the suit 
was instituted there. The place of the wrong and 
that of the forum concurred. And the community 
property system does not obtain there. More than 
that, the material part of section 40-2-4, Revised 
Statutes of Utah 1933, provides in substance that 
the husband shall have no right of recovery for 
personal injuries to the wife, that the wife may 
recover for such injuries as though she were un-
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married and that the recovery shall include medical 
and other expenses paid or assumed by the hus-
band. No case has been called to our attention in 
which the statute was construed. We are, there-
fore, obliged to proceed without direction or guid-
ance by the supreme court of the state in respect 
to the meaning of the local statute. We think the 
statute, when fairly construed, embraces both sub-
stantive and remedial elements. It strips the hus-
band of any right of recovery for personal injuries 
sustained by the wife arising out of the tort of a 
third person, and it vests in her the right to recover 
for such a wrong as though she were an unmar-
ried woman~ It places a married woman on equal 
footing with an unmarried woman in respect to 
redress for personal injuries growing out of a tort. 
It empowers a married woman to maintain in her 
own name a suit to recover for such injuries and it 
vests in her the recovery therefor to the same extent 
and for all purposes as though she were a single 
woman. Cf. Jacobson v. Fullerton, 181 Iowa 1195, 
165 N.W. 358. And it fails to indicate any purpose 
to distinguish between residents and nonresidents 
of the state." 
We call the court's attention to the cases of Traglio 
v. Harris, 104 F. 2d 439; Venuto v. Robinson, 118 F. 2d 
679; Muraszki v. William L. Clifford, Inc., 26 A.2d 578; 
Skillman v. Conner, 193 A. 563 and Myrick v. Griffin, 200 
So. 383. 
We submit to the court that the universal rule of law 
is to the effect that the law of Idaho, where the accident 
occurred, would apply in this case, and the negligence of 
the husband would be imputed to the wife and bar re-
covery. 
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CONCLUSION 
From all of the evidence and a reading of the record 
it becomes most evident that the court correctly found 
that Dow Ted Lewis, plaintiff's husband, was guilty of 
negligence in the manner in which he was driving, and 
that such negligence was the sole proximate cause of 
plaintiff's injuries and damages; that he drove in such a 
manner that he failed to see what was evident, open and 
obvious and that he drove in such a manner that he could 
not stop in time to avoid striking defendant's truck. 
It is also obvious from all of the testimony in the case 
that defendants were not guilty of violating any ordinance, 
and even if they had, the court found as a rna tter of fact 
that the defendants were not guilty of any negligence 
which was a proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries and 
damages. Such a finding on the part of the trier of the 
fact should not be disturbed. 
Further, under the laws of the State of Idaho the 
negligence of the husband is imputed to the wife, and 
although the decision in this case by the trier of the fact 
is amply supported by the evidence as to sole proximate 
cause, the additional issue of imputed negligence in like 
manner bars plaintiff's recovery. We submit this latter 
proposition, in view of the fact that plaintiff raised the 
question in her brief, although the findings of the court 
do not deal with it. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
GRANT C. AADNESEN, 
Attorneys for Defendants 
and Respondents 
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